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a b s t r a c t
With today’s dissemination of embedded systems manipulating sensitive data, it has be-
come important to equip low-level programs with strong security guarantees. Unfortu-
nately, security proofs as done by cryptographers are about algorithms, not about concrete
implementations running on hardware. In this article, we show how to perform security
proofs to guarantee the security of assembly language implementations of cryptographic
primitives. Our approach is based on a framework in the Coq proof assistant that integrates
correctness proofs of assembly programs with game-playing proofs of provable security.
We demonstrate the usability of our approach using the Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom
number generator, for which an MIPS implementation for smartcards is shown crypto-
graphically secure.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With today’s dissemination of embedded systems manipulating sensitive data, it has become important to equip low-
level programs with strong security guarantees. However, despite the fact that most security claims implicitly assume
correct implementation of cryptography, this assumption is never formally enforced in practice. Themain problem of formal
verification of embedded cryptographic software is that, in the current state of research, formal verification remains amajor
undertaking:
(a) Most cryptographic primitives rely on number theory and their pervasive usage calls for efficient implementations. As
a result, we face many advanced algorithms with low-level implementations in assembly language. This already makes
formal proof technically difficult.
(b) Security guarantees about cryptographic primitives is the matter of security proofs, as practiced by cryptographers. In
essence, these proofs aimat showing the security of cryptographic primitives by reduction to computational assumptions.
Formal proofs of such reductions also involve probability theory or group theory.
In fact, formal verification of embedded cryptographic software is even more challenging in that it requires a formal
integration of (a) and (b). To the best of our knowledge, no such integration has ever been attempted so far.
In this article, we address the issue of formal verification of cryptographic assembly codewith security proofs. As pointed
out above, formal verification of cryptographic assembly code and formal verification of security proofs are not the same
matter, even though both dealwith cryptography. As an evidence of thismismatch, one can think of a cryptographic function
such as encryption: its security proof typically relies on a high-level mathematical description, but when laid down in terms
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of assembly code such a function exhibits restrictions due to the choice of implementation. We are therefore essentially
concerned about the integration of these two kinds of formal proofs. We do not question here the theoretical feasibility
of such an integration; rather, we investigate its practical aspects when formal verification is carried out within a proof
assistant based on proof theory.
Indeed, proof assistants based on proof theory, such as Coq [9] or HOL, can be regarded as privileged tools when it comes
to formal verification of security properties. They implement higher order logics that are expressive enough to model and
reason about advanced mathematics as well as precise computation models, and their trusted computing base being small
andwell-understood provides adequate reliability.With such tools, formal verification is by default performed interactively
(bymeans of tactics) but interaction can be automated and intermediate results can be aggregated (in the form of libraries of
lemmas) to facilitate other formal verifications. As a consequence, various frameworks for formal verification of cryptography
using proof assistants based on proof theory have already been proposed: on the one hand, [2,18] for cryptographic assembly
code, and on the other hand, [4–6,20] for security proofs. However, it is not clear how to connect them in practice, or, in other
words, how the formal security proof for a cryptographic primitive relates to its formally verified implementation.Whatever
connection is to be provided between two such frameworks, it has to be developed in a clear way, both understandable by
cryptographers and implementers, and in a reusable fashion, so that new verification efforts can build upon previous ones.
Our main contribution is to propose a concrete approach, supported by a reusable formal framework on top of the Coq
proof assistant [9], for verification of assembly code together with security proofs. As a concrete evidence of usability, we
formally verify a pseudorandom number generator written in assembly for smartcards with a proof of unpredictability.
This choice of application is not gratuitous: this is the first step before verifying more cryptographic primitives, since many
of them actually rely on pseudorandom number generation. To achieve our goal, we extend and integrate two existing
frameworks developed for the Coq proof assistant: one for formal verification of assembly code [2], and another for formal
verification of cryptographic primitives [20]. More precisely, our technical contributions consist in the following:
• We propose an integration in terms of game-playing [24], a popular setting to represent security proofs. We introduce
a new kind of game transformation to serve as a bridge between assembly code and algorithms as dealt with by
cryptographers. This allows for a clear integration, that paves the way for a modular framework, understandable by
both cryptographers and implementers.
• We extend the formal framework for assembly code of [2] to connect with the formal framework for security proofs
of [20]. Various technical extensions are called for, that range from the natural issue of encoding mathematical objects
such as arbitrarily large integers into computer memory, to technical issues such as composition of assembly snippets to
achieve verification of large programs. All in all, it turns out that it is utterly important to provide efficient ways to deal
with low-level details induced by programs being written in assembly. Here, we explain in particular how we deal with
arbitrary jumps in assembly. Concretely, we provide a formalization of the proof-carrying code framework of [23], that
allows us to verify assembly with jumps through standard Hoare logic proofs.
• We provide the first assembly program for a pseudorandom number generator that is formally verified with a security
proof. The generator in question is the Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom number generator (hereafter, BBS) [8] that we
implement in the SmartMIPS assembly.
Outline. In Section 2, we introduce the BBS algorithm and provide an assembly implementation. In Section 3, we explain
howwe integrate formally proofs of functional correctness for assembly codewith game-based security proofs. In Section 4,
we explain our formalization of the proof-carrying code framework of [23], that facilitates formal proof of functional
correctness of assembly code. In Section 5, we explain the formal security proof of BBS in assembly, from its proof of
functional correctness to the implementation step that enables integration with the security proof from [21]. In Section 6,
we validate our formalization by producing automatically a SmartMIPS binary and experimenting its execution. In Section 7,
we comment on technical aspects of the Coq formalization. In Section 8, we comment on related work, and conclude and
comment on future work in Section 9.
2. The BBS pseudorandom number generator
2.1. The BBS algorithm
The security of the Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom number generator [8] is based on mathematical properties of
integersmodulo.We recall some basic notions of number theory: an integer is a quadratic residuemodulom if it is congruent
to a square modulo m; the Legendre of an integer (modulo a prime number) is +1 if it is a quadratic residue, and −1
otherwise; the Jacobi of an integer modulo m is the product of its Legendres for each prime factor of m. BBS exploits the
quadratic residuosity problem: the problem of deciding for Z∗m (the multiplicative group of integers modulo m), where m is
the product of two distinct odd primes, whether elements with Jacobi+1 are in
QRm
def= {x ∈ Z∗m|∃y ∈ Z∗m. y2 (mod m) = x}.
The quadratic residuosity assumption is the assumption that this problem is intractable ([10], ch. 6). BBS exploits the quadratic
residuosity assumption in the particular case ofm being a Blum integer, i.e., the product of two distinct odd primes congruent
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bbs_asm
def=
0: addiu i reg_zero 016 (* init counter for outer loop *)
1: addiu L l 016 (* init pointer to result *)
2: beq i n 238 (* repeat n times *)
3: addiu j reg_zero 016 (* init counter for inner loop *)
4: addiu w reg_zero 016(* init word of temporary storage *)
5: beq j r32 234 (* repeat 32 times *)
6: mul_mod k x x m . . . (* compute X2 (mod M) *)
228: lw w′ 016 x (* load least significant word *)
229: andi w′ w′ 116 (* extract parity bit *)
230: sllv w′ w′ j (* shift parity bit to jth position *)
231: cmd_or w w w′ (* store parity bit in temporary storage *)
232: addiu j j 116 (* increment inner loop counter *)
233: jmp 5 (* end of the inner loop *)
234: sw w 016 L (* store the last 32 parity bits in memory *)
235: addiu L L 416 (* increment pointer to result *)
236: addiu i i 116 (* increment outer loop counter *)
237: jmp 2 (* end of the outer loop *)
238:
Fig. 1. The Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom number generator in assembly.
to 3 modulo 4. Informally, the reason why BBS is secure is that a successful attack on BBS would make the quadratic
residuosity problem tractable, and thus contradict the assumption that it is not.
Here follows an implementation of BBS as a Coq function. It performs iteratively squaring modulo and outputs the result
of parity tests:
bbs (len : N) (seed : Z∗m) def= bbs_rec len seed2
bbs_rec (len : N) (x : QRm) def=
match len with
| 0 ⇒ []
| len′ + 1 ⇒ parity x :: bbs_rec len′ x2
end
The input is the desired number of pseudorandom bits len and a random seed for initialization.
BBS is one of the rare pseudorandom number generators that is cryptographically secure, i.e., it passes all polynomial-
time statistical tests (no polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish between an output sequence of the generator and
a truly random sequence). This strong property is not required of most applications of pseudorandom numbers, except
cryptography. BBS can be proved left-unpredictable (hereafter, unpredictable) under the assumption that the quadratic
residuosity problem is intractable (this is equivalent to proving that BBS passes all polynomial-time statistical tests [27]).
2.2. Implementation of BBS in assembly
The assembly code bbs_asm in Fig. 1 implements BBS. First, let us explain the notations in this figure. Instructions (in
typewriter font) represent SmartMIPS instructions, a superset of MIPS32 with additional instructions for smartcards [16].
Each instruction is uniquely labeled (labels appear on the left and in branching instructions in typewriter font). Constants
are indexed with their length in bits (e.g., 016 stands for 0 represented as a half-word). The names of registers (in italic font)
are parameters; only the null register reg_zero is hardwired in the program.
When the assembly code bbs_asm is called, the registers l, n, x, m, k, and r32 are expected to be initialized as follows.
l contains the address of the storage space for the output (the pseudorandom number to be produced) and n contains the
size in words of this storage space. x and m contain addresses to multi-precision integers (respectively, the integer to be
squared and the modulus) and k contains the size in words minus one of these integers (in other words, the storage spaces
are one word larger than the value contained in k, the reason for this is explained in Section 2.3). r32 contains the value 32,
the word-size in bits.
The assembly code bbs_asm in Fig. 1 essentially consists of a loop with a nested loop. It starts by initializing the register i
(a counter for the outer loop) and the register L (a pointer to the output) (labels 0 and 1).
The outer loop (from label 2 to label 237) produces pseudorandom words and stores them adequately. Each iteration
starts by initializing the register j (a counter for the inner loop) and the register w (a temporary word of storage) (labels 3
and 4). After execution of the inner loop (explained below), the contents of w are stored in memory (label 234) and the
pointer to the output as well as the outer loop counter are incremented (labels 235 and 236).
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mont_mul_strict_init
def=
6: multi_zero re k Z z (* output initialization *)
13: mflhxu reg_zero (* multiplier initialization *)
14: mthi reg_zero
15: mtlo reg_zero
16: montgomery k alpha x y z m r1 re ri X Y M Z q C t s
54: beq C reg_zero 79 (* is the output k+ 1-word long? *)
55: addiu t t 416
56: sw C 016 t
57: addiu ext k 116
58: multisub re r1 z m z M ri q C Z X Y X
78: jmp 117
79: multi_lt_prg k z m X Y ri re Z M
94: beq ri reg_zero 97 (* is the output bigger than the modulus? *)
95: nop
96: jmp 117
97: multisub k r1 z m z re ri q C Z X Y X
117:
Fig. 2. The Montgomery multiplication extended with comparison and subtraction.
The inner loop (from label 5 to label 233) produces one word of pseudorandom bits. First, it first performs an in-place
squaremodulo (mul_mod is an inlined assembly program explained in the next section) (label 6). Second, it stores the parity
bit of the result into register w′ (labels 228 and 229). Third, the parity bit is shifted and stored into w in an appropriate
position using bitwise operations (labels 230 and 231). Last, the inner loop counter is incremented (label 232).
We refer the reader to the Coq development ([3], file mips_cmd.v) for the formal definition of the semantics of each
instruction.
2.3. Implementation of modular multiplication in assembly
In this work, we implement multi-precision square modulo using two successive Montgomery multiplications [17], as
explained below in more details. This is an alternative to classical modular multiplication that is implemented using a
multi-precision multiplication followed by a multi-precision division ([15], ch. 14). Using the Montgomery multiplication
is a reasonable way to implement multi-precision multiplication modulo: the complexity is quadratic like classical
modular multiplication ([15], ch. 14), it avoids the costly multi-precision division while benefiting from specifically tailored
instructions in cryptography-enhanced architectures such as SmartMIPS [16]. Moreover, we already have a formal proof for
an optimized version of the Montgomery multiplication [2], whereas, to the best of our knowledge, such a formal proof for
multi-precision division does not exist yet.
Using Montgomery, modular multiplication is performed as follows. Given three k-word integers M, X, Y , the Mont-
gomery multiplication computes a k + 1-word integer Z such that βkZ = X .Y (mod M) and Z < 2M (β = 232). This
is almost a multiplication modulo except for the factor βk in front of Z and because Z ≮ M in general. To turn it into a
genuine multiplication modulo, one needs (1) an additional subtraction to reduce Z by M when Z ≥ M and (2) a second
pass to eliminate the factor βk in front of Z . This second pass requires as an additional input a k-word B = β2k (mod M);
given Z such that βkZ = X .Y (mod M) (as provided by the first Montgomery multiplication), it suffices to compute Z ′
such that βkZ ′ = Z .B (mod M): if M is odd (this is generally the case for cryptographic applications), one obtains as de-
sired Z ′ = X .Y (mod M). Algorithms in pseudo-code and illustrations can be found in [15], ch. 14; [2] provides a concrete
implementation of the Montgomery multiplication together with its formal verification.
The assembly codemont_mul_strict_init in Fig. 2 implements the Montgomery multiplication extended with comparison
and subtraction, as explained in the previous paragraph.When the assembly codemont_mul_strict_init is called, registers x, y,
m, z, k, and alpha are expected to be initialized as follows. x, y,m contain addresses to multi-precision integers (respectively,
the integers to bemultiplied and themodulus). z contains the address of the storage space for the output. k contains the size
in words minus one of the storage spaces pointed to by the previous registers; the storage spaces are one word larger than
the value contained in k to cope with the possibility for the Montgomery multiplication to produce outputs larger than the
modulus. alpha contains the value α such thatm0.α = −1 (mod β)wherem0 is the least significant word of the modulus;
this is a prerequisite for the correct execution of the Montgomery multiplication (see [15], ch. 14).
The assembly codemont_mul_strict_init starts by zeroing the output storage (label 6) and the SmartMIPSmultiplier, a set
of special registers (labels 13, 14 and 15). These initializations to zero are a prerequisite for the correct execution of the rest
of the code. Then, the program calls the Montgomery multiplicationmontgomery, the function verified in [2] (label 16).
As explained above, the result of theMontgomerymultiplicationmay be larger than themodulus, in which case we need
to perform an additional subtraction. Our implementation of the Montgomery multiplication is such that the value of the
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mul_mod
def=
6: mont_mul_strict_init k alpha x x y m r1 re ri X B Y M q C t s
117: mont_mul_strict_init k alpha y b x m r1 re ri X B Y M q C t s
228:
Fig. 3.Modular multiplication implemented by two Montgomery multiplications.
most significant word of the output appears in the register C; the execution of the rest of the program depends on its value
(hence the test at label 54).
If the register C is not zero, then the result of the Montgomery multiplication is necessarily larger than the modulus, and
thus we have to perform a subtraction. In this case, we store the value of C appropriately into memory (labels 55 and 56)
and performs an in-place multi-precision subtraction (label 58).
If the register C is zero, then we need to perform a (multi-precision) comparison to determine whether the result of the
Montgomery multiplication is larger than the modulus (label 79). According to the result of this comparison (label 94), a
subtraction may be necessary. If the result is smaller than the modulus, then we are done (labels 95 and 96); otherwise, we
perform an in-place multi-precision subtraction (label 97).
We refer the reader to the Coq development [3] for the formalization of the functionsmontgomery (taken from [2]), in-
place subtractionmulti_sub (derived from [2]),multi-precision comparisonmulti_lt and the initialization functionmulti_zero.
The assembly code mul_mod in Fig. 3 implements modular multiplication by means of two successive calls to the
extended version of the Montgomery multiplication (labels 6 and 117). It expects in particular that the register b points
to the pre-computed k-word B = β2k (mod M) as explained previously.
3. Game-based proofs for assembly
Security proofs usually apply to algorithms without any consideration for implementation. In order to prove unpre-
dictability directly on assembly code,we propose in Section 3.3 to lift a standard definition borrowed from game-playing [24].
Game-playing is a methodology to write security proofs that are easier to verify; it lends itself well to formalization
[4–6,20]. A security property ismodeled as a game (a probabilistic program) to be solved by an attacker, the latter beingmod-
eled as a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) functionwhose code is unknown. A security proof consists in showing that any
attacker has only little advantage over a random player, by (1) stating the security property for the cryptographic primitive
to be verified, and (2) reducing the corresponding game to some computational assumption through game transformations.
In this section, we illustrate the game-playing methodology and our extension with implementation steps in the case of
unpredictability for BBS.
3.1. Unpredictability
Regarding unpredictability for a function f , the game unpredictability f is defined as follows (following the formalization
of [21]): a seed is picked at random in the set of seeds (Z∗m in the case of BBS); a sequence of bits [b0, . . . , blen] is computed
by f ; this sequence, deprived of its first bit b0, is passed to the attacker A; and the latter returns its guess b0. The result of
the game is whether the guess is right or not. Using notations from [21], this game is written as:
unpredictability f
def=

seed
R← Z∗m;
[b0, . . . , blen]← f (len+ 1, seed);b0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
return (b0 = b0)
The goal is then to prove that the above game is indistinguishable from the following gamewhich simply consists in flipping
a coin:
flip
def=

b
R← {true, false};
return b
3.2. Game transformations
The proof of indistinguishability consists in a sequence of game transformations from a game to another game that is
indistinguishable. We illustrate this by showing the first game transformation in the proof of unpredictability for BBS (as
presented in [21]). Following Shoup’s classification, this transformation is a bridging step: it consists in restating how certain
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quantities can be computed in a completely equivalent way. We first unfold the definition of bbs in unpredictability bbs and
obtain the game
seed
R← Z∗m;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs_rec(len+ 1, seed2);b0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
return (b0 = b0)
Because the functionwhichmaps an x ∈ Z∗m to x2 ∈ QRm is a surjective four-to-one function, choosing at randoma seed ∈ Z∗m
and then use only its square seed2 is the same as picking at random an x ∈ QRm and using x instead of seed2. The game can
thus be rewritten as the indistinguishable game
x
R← QRm;
[b0, . . . , blen]← bbs_rec(len+ 1, x);b0 ⇐ A([b1, . . . , blen]);
return (b0 = b0)
A series of such transformations based on various mathematical facts goes on until we reach the game
x
R← Z∗m(+1);b ⇐  b′ ⇐ A(m, x2);
return (b′ ⊕ parity(x)⊕ 1);
return (b = qr(x))
where qr(x) is equal to true if x is a quadratic residue or false otherwise, and Z∗m(+1) is the subset of Z∗m whose elements
have Jacobi+1.
This is at this point that we use the quadratic residuosity assumption that states that games of the form
x
R← Z∗m(+1);b ⇐ A′(m, x);
return (b = qr(x))
are indistinguishable (for any attacker A′) from the game flip, i.e., the attacker cannot do better than flipping a coin when
trying to guess the quadratic residuosity of an element of Z∗m(+1). See [21] for the complete formalization in Coq. Following
Shoup’s classification, this is a transition based on indistinguishability. We have thus reduced the unpredictability game into
a game consisting in flipping a coin. This concludes the security proof.
Note that there is a third kind of game transformation in the classification by Shoup: transition based on failure events [24].
However it is not used in the security proof of BBS.
3.3. Implementation step
To define unpredictability for assembly code, one needs to lift the previous game definition because it applies to
mathematical functions without any consideration for their implementations. This makes a difference because, contrary to
mathematical functions, assembly code does not work as intended for arbitrary input, because of restrictions inherited from
implementation choices. Our basic idea is thus to extract from the assembly code c its semantics in terms of a mathematical
function and to inject it into the definition of the unpredictability game:
unpredictability_assembly c
def= unpredictability (λx.decode (JcK(encode x))))
where JcK is the function that maps an initial state to the final state resulting from the execution of c (for JcK to be well-
defined as a function, the assembly code c has to be deterministic and terminating); encode and decode respectively encode
input data into an initial state and decode a final state into output data.
Oneneeds tomake clear underwhich restrictions the assembly codebehaves as intended, i.e., state a predicate restrictions
such that:
∀x.restrictions x ⇒ decode (JcK(encode x)) = f x (Implem. Step Lemma)
where f is themathematical function that c is supposed to implement. This correctness property allows to rewrite the game
unpredictability_assembly c into the initial game unpredictability f of cryptographers’ game-based security proof.
The advantage of the lifting explained above is that it makes clear how to organize formal verification of assembly code
with security proofs. Games for assembly connect to standard games through implementation steps, that are justified formally
by ensuring determinism, termination, and correctness. Since implementation steps come in addition to the other kind of
game transformations listed by Shoup [24], this makes it easier to develop a formal framework for verification of assembly
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Fig. 4. Overview of a game-based security proof with an implementation step.
with security proofs: pick up a formal framework for game-based proofs and a formal framework for assembly, and add the
machinery for implementation steps.
Fig. 4 gives an overview of a game-based security proof for an implementation. One starts with the game for implemen-
tation that includes interface functions encode and decode in order to exchange data between the computer world of the
implementation (arrays of 32-bit words, etc.) and the mathematical world of the security definition (integers modulo, etc.).
The first game transformation is the implementation step that replaces the implementation and its interface functions with
the cryptographic algorithm. The correctness proof of the implementation ensures that the new game is indistinguishable
from the previous one. Then the usual game-based security proof by cryptographers can be carried on until one reaches the
intractable game that is thus proved indistinguishable from the initial one: if the attacker could win the implementation
game, then it could also win the intractable game.
4. Verification of functional correctness of assembly
To perform security proofs of an implementation, we need in particular to prove its functional correctness. This is
technically difficult for assembly because handling of jumps results in non-standard logics that are either complex [25]
or verbose [23]. When used directly, these logics are thus less practical than standard Hoare logic for While programs
(i.e., imperative programs built out of while-loops). Yet, here, we choose to formalize the proof-carrying code framework
of [23] because it provides not only a compositional operational semantics and Hoare logic for assembly with jumps, but
also shows that derivations for this non-standard operational semantics and Hoare logic can be obtained by compilation
from operational semantics and Hoare logic for While programs. In other words, it becomes possible to work with While
programs while still being able to recover proofs in Hoare logic for assembly with jumps.
In this section, we formalize the proof-carrying code framework of [23] in a genericway as a Coqmodule parametrized by
a formalization ofHoare logic forWhileprograms. This latter formalization ofHoare logic itself abstracts the implementation
of states, the language of assertions, and the underlying set of one-step, non-branching instructions. As a consequence, we
can instantiate the proof-carrying code framework of [23] with various concrete instruction sets and we are also able to
accommodate the connectives of separation logic, as well as the frame rule [22]. Indeed, this is separation logic that we use
in Section 5.1 to specify and prove the functional correctness of the implementation of BBS in assembly.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we explain the generic formalization of Hoare logic for While. In
Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we provide a generic formalization of the operational semantics and of the Hoare logic of SGoto, the
imperative language with jumps of [23]. In Section 4.4, we formalize the compilation relation between SGoto and While
programs, as well as the relation between proofs in the Hoare logic of While and proofs in the Hoare logic of SGoto. In
Section 4.5, we instantiate our generic formalizationwith a concrete instruction set, namely SmartMIPS [16], and instrument
it with the connectives of separation logic.
4.1. A parametric formalization of Hoare logic
A state is a pair of a store and a heap: state
def= store × heap. Since, we are dealing with low-level languages such as
assembly whose instructions may trap, we distinguish error states by an option type: a state s can be the error state None
or is otherwise noted ⌊s⌋.
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s − i → s′
s − i _ s′ s − c1 _ s′′ s′′ − c2 _ s′s − c1;c2 _ s′ None − c _ None
BJbKs ⌊s⌋ − c1 _ s′
⌊s⌋ − if b then c1 else c2 _ s′
BJbKs ⌊s⌋ − c _ s′
s′ − while b c _ s′′
⌊s⌋ − while b c _ s′′
¬BJbKs ⌊s⌋ − c2 _ s′
⌊s⌋ − if b then c1 else c2 _ s′ ¬BJbKs⌊s⌋ − while b c _ ⌊s⌋
Fig. 5. Standard big-step operational semantics ofWhile programs.
{P} i {Q }
{P } i {Q}
{P } c1 {R} {R} c2 {Q}{P } c1;c2 {Q}
P ⇒ P ′ P ′ c Q′ Q′ ⇒ Q
{P } c {Q}
λs, h . P s h ∧BJbK(s,h) c1 {Q}
λs, h . P s h ∧ ¬BJbK(s,h) c2 {Q}
{P } if b then c1 else c2 {Q}

λs, h . P s h ∧BJbK(s,h) c {P }
{P } while b c λs, h . P s h ∧ ¬BJbK(s,h)
Fig. 6. Standard Hoare logic forWhile programs.
We assume a set of one-step, non-branching instructions iwhose semantics is given by the predicate s − i → s′ where
i is an instruction, s (resp. s′) is the state before (resp. after) its execution such that the following properties hold:
Parameter exec0_deter : ∀s, i, s1, s2 . s − i → s1 ⇒ s − i → s2 ⇒ s1= s2.
Parameter from_none0 : ∀c, s . None − c → s ⇒ s = None.
Parameter cmd0_terminate : ∀c, s . ∃s′ . ⌊s⌋ − c → s′.
At this point, it should be noted that we consider a set of deterministic instructions because we are dealing with assembly.
The absence of deterministic instructions comes in contrastwith standard separation logic [22] that accommodates dynamic
memory allocation (‘‘malloc’’). This will not prevent us from formalizing the connectives of separation logic (see Section 4.5)
in such a way that the frame rule is provable (following [13]).
Boolean expressions (ranged over by b) are equipped with an evaluation function BJbKs where s is a state. At this level
of abstraction, we require the type of boolean expressions to feature at least a negation operator (to be used later for
compilation) such that:
Parameter eval_b_neg : ∀b, s . ¬BJbKs ⇔ BJ¬bKs.
The syntax of While programs (ranged over by c) is built out of the one-step, non-branching instructions i, sequences
(c1;c2), structured branching (if b then c1 else c2), and while-loops (while b c). The standard big-step operational
semantics is defined in Fig. 5.
The properties of states are specified using a shallow embedding of the logical connectives, i.e., assertions are functions
from states (a pair of a store and a heap) to the type Prop of propositions in Coq: assertion
def= store ⇒ heap ⇒ Prop.
Thanks to this embedding, it is possible to use the higher order logic of Coq to formalize various logical connectives. In
fact, we use separation logic in Section 5.1 to specify and prove the functional correctness of the implementation of BBS
in assembly. We defer to Section 4.5 explanations about how the connectives of separation logic are formalized using this
embedding.
We assume defined for all instructions i, a relation {P } i {Q} , where P and Q are assertions, that is sound w.r.t. the
operational semantics:
Parameter soundness0 : ∀P ,Q, i . {P } i {Q} ⇒ ∀s, h . P s h ⇒
¬ (⌊(s, h)⌋ − i _ None) ∧ ∀s′, h′ . ⌊(s, h)⌋ − c _ ⌊(s′, h′)⌋ ⇒ Q s′ h′ .
In Fig. 6, we define a generic Hoare logic as the proof system for triples of the form {P } c {Q}whereP andQ are assertions
and c is aWhile program.
Under the assumption soundness0, the proof system of Fig. 6 is proved sound w.r.t. the big-step operational semantics of
Fig. 5.
As for relative completeness, let us define the weakest precondition as follows:
wp_semantics c Q
def= λs, h . ¬ (⌊(s, h)⌋ − c _ None) ∧∀s′, h′ . ⌊(s, h)⌋ − c _ ⌊(s′, h′)⌋ ⇒ Q s′ h′ .
Then the above proof system is also proved relatively complete under the following assumption:
Parameter wp_semantics_sound0 : ∀i,Q . {wp_semantics i Q} i {Q} .
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⌊s⌋ − i → ⌊s′⌋
⌊(l, s)⌋  l : i _ ⌊(l+ 1, s′)⌋ ⌊s⌋ − i → None⌊(l, s)⌋  l : i _ None
l ≠ l′
⌊(l, s)⌋  l : jmp l′ _ ⌊(l′, s)⌋
BJbKs l ≠ l′
⌊(l, s)⌋  l : cjmp b l′ _ ⌊(l′, s)⌋
l ∈ dom(c1)
⌊(l, s)⌋  c1 _ s′ s′  c1 ⊕ c2 _ s′′
⌊(l, s)⌋  c1 ⊕ c2 _ s′′
¬BJbKs
⌊(l, s)⌋  l : cjmp b l′ _ ⌊(l+ 1, s)⌋
l ∈ dom(c2)
⌊(l, s)⌋  c2 _ s′ s′  c1 ⊕ c2 _ s′′
⌊(l, s)⌋  c1 ⊕ c2 _ s′′
None  c _ None l /∈ dom(c)⌊(l, s)⌋  c _ ⌊(l, s)⌋
Fig. 7. Big-step operational semantics of assembly with jumps.
4.2. Operational semantics of SGoto
We provide a generic formalization of SGoto, the imperative language with jumps of [23].
To accommodate jumps, states are extendedwith a label (that represents the value of the program counter of the instruc-
tion being currently executed): lstate
def= option (label× state). The fact that we handle error states (as an option type)
is a slight generalization w.r.t. [23].
An assembly program is formalized as a set of labeled instructions. The latter are either labeled one-step, non-branching
instructions or jump instructions (unconditional jumps jmp l or conditional jumps cjmp b l). dom(c) is the set of the labels
of the instructions of the assembly program c. Sets of labeled instructions are put together using⊕.
The operational semantics of assembly programs is a predicate noted s  c _ s′ where c is a set of labeled instructions,
s (resp. s′) is the state before (resp. after) its execution. It is defined inductively by the rules of Fig. 7. The originality of this
semantics can be appreciated by looking at the two rules for sequences using⊕; intuitively, they are a mix of the rules for
sequence and while-loops of traditional Hoare logic.
4.3. Hoare logic for SGoto
The non-standard operational semantics of the previous section gives rise to a non-standard but compositional Hoare
logic for assembly with jumps [23].
The definition of assertions is extended so that satisfiability depends on the value of the current label: assn
def= label ⇒
assertion.
A triple is noted [P ] c [Q] where P and Q are labeled assertions (type assn) and c is an assembly program with jumps.
We introduce predicate transformers that enforce assertions to be satisfiable for labels inside (resp. outside) a domain:
P |d def= λl . P l ∧ l ∈ d, and P |d def= λl . P l ∧ l /∈ d.
[23] defines a Hoare logic for an archetypal low-level language with only assignment. To allow for more one-step, non-
branching instructions, we introduce an abstract weakest precondition functionWP insn i P such that:
Parameter wp0_no_err : ∀s, h, i,P . WP insn i P s h ⇒ ¬⌊(s, h)⌋ − i → None.
Parameter exec0_wp0 : ∀s, h, i, s′, h′ . ⌊(s, h)⌋ − i → ⌊(s′, h′)⌋ ⇒
∀P .WP insn i P s h ⇔ P s′ h′.
Using the functionWP insn, we formalize the rules for the compositional Hoare logic in Fig. 8.
Using only the constructs and properties introduced so far in this section and following [23], the logic of Fig. 8 is formally
proved sound and complete w.r.t. the non-standard big-step operational semantics of Fig. 7.
4.4. Compilation fromWhile to SGoto
The derivations for the previous non-standard operational semantics and Hoare logic can also be obtained from standard
operational semantics and Hoare logic for While programs through compilation [23]. This is a result of interest because
it allows us to work with standard operational semantics and Hoare logic (that are more practical to deal with formally,
the non-standard Hoare logic of [23] being more verbose) while still being able to recover formal proofs for assembly with
jumps (these are the formal proofs that we really want, for example for shipping in a proof-carrying code scenario).
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
λpc, s, h. pc = l ∧ (P j s h ∨ j = l) ∨
pc ≠ l ∧ P pc s h

l : jmp j [P ]
 λpc, s, h. pc = l ∧  ¬BJbK(s,h) ∧ P (l+ 1) s h ∨BJbK(s,h) ∧ (P j s h ∨ j = l)

∨
pc ≠ l ∧ P pc s h
 l : cjmp b j [P ]
[P ] nop [P ]

λpc, s, h. pc = l ∧WP insn i (P (l+ 1)) s h ∨
pc ≠ l ∧ P pc s h

l : i [P ]

P |dom(c1)

c1 [P ]

P |dom(c2)

c2 [P ]
[P ] c1 ⊕ c2

P |dom(c1⊕c2)
 ∀l.P l ⇒ P
′ l
P ′

c

Q′

∀l.Q′ l ⇒ Q l
[P ] c [Q]
Fig. 8. Hoare logic for assembly with jumps.
i l↘l+1 l : i
c1 l↘l1 c ′1 c2 l1↘l2 c ′2
c1;c2 l↘l2 c ′1 ⊕ c ′2
c1 l1+1↘l2 c ′1 c2 l+1↘l1 c ′2
if b then c1 else c2 l↘l2 l : cjmp b (l1 + 1)⊕ ((c ′2 ⊕ l1 : jmp l2)⊕ c ′1)
c l+1↘l1 c ′
while b c l↘l1+1 l : cjmp (¬b) (l1 + 1)⊕ (c ′ ⊕ l1 : jmp l)
Fig. 9. Compilation fromWhile to SGoto programs.
The compilation procedure turns the if-then-else and while loops into conditional and unconditional jumps. The
compilation of program c with while-loops to an assembly program c ′ with jumps is defined in Fig. 9 inductively by the
predicate c l↘l′ c ′ where l (resp. l′) is the start (resp. end) label of the compiled program.
Through compilation, derivations of operational semantics are transformed from the standard big-step operational
semantics (Fig. 5) to the big-step operational semantics of assembly with jumps (Fig. 7). Similarly, proofs in separation
logic are transformed from the standard ones (Fig. 6) to the ones of [23] (Fig. 8). This is captured by the following lemmas:
Lemma preservation_of _evaluations : ∀c, s, l, c ′, s′, l′ .
c l↘l′ c ′ ⇒ ⌊s⌋ − c _ ⌊s′⌋ ⇒ ⌊(l, s)⌋  c ′ _ ⌊(l+ card(dom(c ′)), s′)⌋.
Lemma preservation_hoare : ∀P ,Q, c . {P } c {Q} ⇒
∀l, c ′, l′ . c l↘l′ c ′ ⇒ [λpc, s, h . pc = l ∧ P s h] c ′

λpc, s, h . pc = l′ ∧Q s h .
4.5. Instantiation of While and SGoto to SmartMIPS
We instantiate the previous formalization of [23] to the SmartMIPS assembly language. Instantiation amounts to provid-
ing the definition of SmartMIPS states, the set of SmartMIPS instructions, following the official MIPS documentation [16], as
well as proofs for the assumptions about them introduced so far in this section. Instantiation provides modules for While
and SGoto operational semantics, Hoare logic, and certified compilation fromWhile to SGoto.
A SmartMIPS store is a collection of registers containing integers of finite size. Let intn be the type of machine integers
encoded with n bits. Most registers contain values of type int32 (the exception is the extended accumulator of type intn with
n ≥ 8).We have the following notations:RJrKs is the value of register r in store s; s{v/r} is the store resulting from updating
register r with value v in store s. A heap is a finite map from locations to integers of type int32. The heap is tailored to word-
accesses because most memory accesses in our applications are word-aligned. We have the following notation: h[l] is the
contents of location l of the heap h; it is None when the location is undefined. h1 ⊥ h2 holds when h1 and h2 are disjoint
and h1 ∪ h2 represents the union of h1 and h2; [p, z] represents a singleton heap that associates address pwith the value z.
We give the semantics of one-step, non-branching instructions by defining as an inductive type a predicate noted
s − i → s′ where i is a SmartMIPS instruction, s (resp. s′) is the state before (resp. after) its execution. When formalizing
the semantics of instructions, we need to express conditions such as word-alignment, absence of arithmetic overflow, etc.
These conditions require manipulations such as sign-extending int16 integers to int32 integers, checking for divisibility by 4,
etc. For this purpose, we introduce various operators: (v)int16int32 sign-extends the value v from 16 to 32 bits, (v)int32N
interprets the value v as an unsigned integer, etc.
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RJbaseKs +h (off )int16int32int32N = 4× p h[p] = ⌊z⌋⌊(s, h)⌋ − lw rt off base → ⌊(s{z/rt}, h)⌋ exec0_lw
∀p. RJbaseKs +h (off )int16int32int32N ≠ 4× p ∨ h[p] = None⌊(s, h)⌋ − lw rt off base → None exec0_lw_error
Fig. 10. Semantics of lw.
Fig. 10 illustrates the semantics of MIPS instructions with the rules for the instruction lw (‘‘load word’’). There are two
rules depending on whether the memory access is word-aligned and the accessed location is defined. (The notation +h is
the addition of finite-size integers.)
Accordingly, we also instantiate the weakest precondition function WP insn. Here is an excerpt of this function for the
‘‘load word’’ instruction:
WP insn i Q
def= match i with
· · ·
| lw rt off base ⇒ λs, h.∃p.

RJbaseKs +h (RJoff Ks)int16int32int32N=4×p ∧∃z.h[p]=⌊z⌋ ∧ Q s{z/rt} h
· · ·
end
In total, we have formalized the semantics of 29 SmartMIPS one-step, non-branching SmartMIPS instructions, as well as
4 conditional jumps (beq, bne, bltz, bgez).
Formalization of separation logic. In addition to the properties provided by the formalization of [23], the formal verification
of BBS in assembly in the next section (Section 5.1) also relies on a formalization of separation logic, including the frame
rule, the key lemma that allows us to compose code snippets. This formalization is essentially taken from [2] and [13] and
is orthogonal to the formalization of [23] that we carried out in the previous sections. The formalization of the connectives
of separation logic takes advantage of the fact that the assertions are shallow embedded. For example, given two assertions
P and Q, the separating conjunction is conveniently formalized as follows: P ⋆ Q
def= λs, h. ∃h1, h2. h1 ⊥ h2 ∧ h =
h1 ∪ h2 ∧ P s h1 ∧ Q s h2. The ‘‘mapsto’’ connective of separation logic that specifies a singleton heap is formalized as
follows: e → e′ def= λs, h . ∃p . (EJeKs)int32N = 4× p ∧ h = [p, EJe′Ks]where e and e′ are expressions made of registers,
constants, and a few arithmetic operators and EJeKs represents the value of the expression e in store s. All the details can be
found in the Coq development [3].
5. Security proof for BBS in assembly
5.1. Functional correctness
In practice, we conduct formal proof using separation logic forWhile programs and obtain afterward the desired triple
for assembly with jumps by applying the preservation lemma preservation_hoare (Section 4.4). The formal verification effort
therefore concentrates on the triple of Fig. 11 where the assembly programwith jumps has been replaced by its decompiled
versionwith the if-then-else andwhile loops (manual decompilationproved correctw.r.t. the compilation relation defined in
Fig. 9). Let us explain this triple by commenting in turn about the auxiliary variables, the precondition, and the postcondition.
Auxiliary variables. The first lines of Fig. 11 introduce a set of pairwise distinct registers. nn and nk record the size in words
of, resp., the pseudorandom number to be produced and the other multi-precision integers involved in the computation. X,
M, L, B, and Y are lists of int32 machine integers that encode multi-precision integers and |·| is the notation for their length.
More precisely, X encodes the random seed, M encodes the modulus, L is for the pseudorandom number to be produced,
B encodes β2 nk (mod M) as explained in Section 2.3, and Y is for temporary storage (for the intermediate result of the
modular multiplication). The fact that the modulus is odd is used in the modular multiplication as explained in Section 2.3.
The introduction of a value vα equal to the inverse modulo β of the least significant word of the modulus is specific to the
Montgomery multiplication and has been explained in Section 2.3. The following alignment restrictions (values vi that are
multiple of 4) are imposed by SmartMIPS instructions that access memory. Finally, the inequalities guarantee that data fits
in the (finite) memory of the computer.
Note that, as long as 4(4nk + nn + 2) < β , nn and nk can be very large, nk effectively covering lengths for which the
quadratic residuosity problem is indeed difficult in practice. This is one desirable side-effect of our approach to precisely
pinpoint the range of nk. It is here that the restrictions imposed by implementation choices mentioned in Section 3 appear,
for the above triple cannot be proved for arbitrary values of nn and nk.
Precondition. The precondition associates registers’ values with auxiliary variables and specifies the initial state by way
of a formula using connectives of separation logic. The separating conjunction explained in Section 4.5 is used to enforce
disjointness of memory regions. The Z⇒ connective is a generalization of the ‘‘mapsto’’ connective explained in Section 4.5:
it maps an address to a list of values contiguous in memory instead of a single value. X; ; 032 means that a trailing 032 is
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Lemma bbs_triple :
∀i, L, l, n, j, r32, k, α, x, y,m, r1, re, ri, X, Y ,M, q, C, t, rs, rb, B, w′, w.
nodup (i, L, l, n, j, r32, k, α, x, y,m, r1, re, ri, X, Y ,M, q, C, t, rs, rb, B, w′, w, reg_zero)⇒
∀nn, nk,X,M, L,B,Y . |L| = nn ∧ |X| = |B| = |M| = |Y| = nk ⇒
[X]β , [B]β < [M]β ∧ [B]β = β2 nk (mod [M]β) ∧ odd([M]β) ⇒∀vα . (M.0)int32N . (vα)int32N = −1 (mod β) ⇒∀vx, nx, vy, ny, nm, vm, nb, vb, vl, nl. (vx)int32N = 4 nx ∧

vy

int32N = 4 ny ∧
(vm)int32N = 4 nm ∧ (vb)int32N = 4 nb ∧ (vl)int32N = 4 nl ⇒
4 ny + 4 (nk + 1) < β ∧ 4 nx + 4 (nk + 1) < β ∧ 4 nl + 4 nn < β ⇒
λs, h. (RJkKs)int32N = nk ∧ (RJnKs)int32N = nn ∧ RJxKs = vx ∧ RJyKs = vy ∧
RJmKs = vm ∧RJrbKs = vb ∧RJαKs = vα ∧RJlKs = vl ∧ (RJr32Ks)int32N = 32 ∧
(x Z⇒ X; ; 032) ⋆ (m Z⇒ M; ; 032) ⋆ (l Z⇒ L) ⋆ (y Z⇒ Y; ; 032) ⋆ (rb Z⇒ B) s h

bbs_asmdecompile i L l n j r32 k α x y m r1 re ri X Y M q C t rs rb B w′ w
λs, h . ∃X, L,Y . |L| = nn ∧ |X| = |Y| = nk ∧ (RJkKs)int32N = nk ∧
(RJnKs)int32N = nn ∧RJxKs = vx ∧RJyKs = vy ∧RJmKs = vm ∧RJrbKs = vb ∧
RJαKs = vα ∧ RJlKs = vl ∧ (RJr32Ks)int32N = 32 ∧
(x Z⇒ X; ; 032) ⋆ (m Z⇒ M; ; 032) ⋆ (l Z⇒ L) ⋆ (y Z⇒ Y; ; 032) ⋆ (rb Z⇒ B) s h ∧
flatten(map bits L) = bbs_fun_rec (32 nn) ([X]β 2 (mod [M]β)) [M]β

Fig. 11. Functional correctness of BBS in assembly.
allocated at the end of multi-precision integers: this is to support potential overflows during the modular multiplication, as
explained in Section 2.3.
Postcondition. In the postcondition, the lists X, L, and Y are existentially quantified because they correspond to memory
regions modified by execution. In particular, the final contents of L are specified to be the intended list of pseudorandom
bits. Note that we are using a generalized version of the BBS algorithm (bbs_fun below takes the modulus m in Z, whereas
bbs in Section 2.1 uses the types Z∗m and QRm):
bbs_fun (len : N) (seed : Z) (m : Z) def= bbs_fun_rec len (seed2 (mod m)) m
bbs_fun_rec (len : N) (x : Z) (m : Z) def=
match len with
| 0 ⇒ []
| len′ + 1 ⇒ parity x :: bbs_fun_rec len′ (x2 (mod m)) m
end
This is a sound generalization because the information that Z∗m is a cyclic group is not needed in the proof of functional
correctness (only in the security proof).
5.2. Extraction of the semantics of BBS in assembly
For the rest of this section (i.e., for Sections 5.2 and 5.3), we assume given a set of pairwise distinct registers i, L, l, n, j, r32,
k, α, x, y,m, r1, re, ri, X , Y ,M , q, C , t , rs, rb, B,w′, andw.
Before proceeding to the extraction of the semantics of BBS in assembly, we specialize the triple of Section 5.1 by intro-
ducing two functions encode and decode: encode n k seed m builds a state from the requested number n of pseudorandom
32-bit words, the number k of 32-bit words reserved for the encoding of the seed and the modulus, the seed, and the modu-
lusm; and decode s is the list of pseudorandom bits stored in the state s. These functions hide many technical details of the
generic triple of Section 5.1 but impose a specific memory layout depicted in Fig. 12.
Then the rule of consequence of Hoare logic allows for proving a simplified Hoare triple:
Lemma bbs_triple_encode_decode :
∀nn, nk,m, seed. 0 < m < βnk ∧ odd(m) ∧ 0 ≤ seed < m ∧ 4(4nk + nn + 2) < β ⇒
λs, h . encode nn nk seed m = (s, h) 
bbs_asmdecompile i L l n j r32 k α x y m r1 re ri X Y M q C t rs rb B w′ w
λs, h . decode (s, h) = bbs_fun (32 nn) seed m 
We now proceed to the extraction of the semantics of bbs_asm. As explained in Section 3, we prove for this purpose that
bbs_asm is terminating. Determinism is a property of the assembly as it is formalized. First, we prove that there is a final
state, without proving whether it is an error state or not:
Lemma bbs_termination : ∀s0.∃sf .
⌊s0⌋ − bbs_asmdecompile i L l n j r32 kα x ym r1 re ri X Y M q C t rs rb Bw′ w _ sf .
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Fig. 12. Encoding and decoding of input/output.
This is proved by induction on the variant of the outermost loop, and then on nested loops. Second, by the separation
logic triple, we derive under the same restrictions the fact that this final state cannot be an error state. Then, using the
preservation_of_evaluations lemma of Section 4.4, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma exec_bbs_asm :
∀nn, nk,m, seed. 0 < m < βnk ∧ odd(m) ∧ 0 ≤ seed < m ∧ 4(4nk + nn + 2) < β ⇒
∃sf .⌊(0, encode nn nk seed m)⌋
bbs_asm i L l n j r32 kα x ym r1 re ri X Y M q C t rs rb Bw′ w _ ⌊(238, sf )⌋.
Because the above lemma is existential, it allows us to define a function execbbs_asm that realizes bbs_asm bymapping, in
order, the number of desired 32-bit words for the pseudorandom bits, the number of 32-bit words necessary to encode the
seed and the modulus, and finally the seed and the modulus m themselves so that the semantics of the assembly program
bbs_asm is defined as follows (the function || · || returns the number of digits of integers, as formalized by the function
N_digits of the standard Coq library):
Jbbs_asmKencode,decode def=
λlen,m, seed.prefixlen

decode

execbbs_asm
 len
32
  ||m||+1
32

m seed

Since bbs_asm always returns a number of pseudorandom bits that is a multiple of 32, we need to take a prefix of the output
because the unpredictability game from [21] may require less bits.
5.3. Implementation step
The final step is to produce a rewriting lemma between the semantics of bbs_asm and the Coq function bbs (as explained
in Section 3). First, using the separation logic triple of Section 5.1, by preservation ofHoare triples (lemma preservation_hoare)
and the soundness of the Hoare logic of SGoto, we derive that:
Lemma bbs_correct :
∀nn, nk,m, seed. 0 < m < βnk ∧ odd(m) ∧ 0 ≤ seed < m ∧ 4(4nk + nn + 2) < β ⇒
∀sf , ⌊(0, encode nn nk seed m)⌋
bbs_asm i L l n j r32 kα x ym r1 re ri X Y M q C t rs rb Bw′ w _ ⌊(238, sf )⌋ ⇒
decode sf = bbs_fun_rec 32 nn (seed2 (mod m)) m.
Finally, we are able to produce the rewriting lemma that lets us prove unpredictability of the assembly program using
the formal proof of unpredictability of the Coq function as a sub-lemma:
Lemma bbs_implem_step : ∀len,m, seed. 4

4
 len+1
32
+  ||m||+132 + 2 < β ⇒Jbbs_asmKencode,decode (len+ 1) m seed = bbs (len+ 1) seed.
This last lemma can be used to perform the implementation step as described in Section 3, making use of the security
proof of the BBS algorithm taken directly from [21].
6. Validating experiment
As a validating experiment, we ran our implementation of BBS in a SmartMIPS simulator.We formalized in Coq a function
that turns the abstract syntax for assembly into concrete syntax so as to produce snippets of code. The transformation relies
on custom functions to turn registers, constantmachine integers, etc. (r2s,si2s, etc. below) into Coq strings of the standard
library of Coq. For illustration, here is the pattern matching corresponding to the load instruction lw whose formalization
we explained in Section 4.5:
cmd0_to_string_aux c s
def= match c with
· · ·
| lw rt off base ⇒
′′lw ′′ ++ (r2s rt (comma (si2s off (String ′′(′′ (r2s base (String ′′)′′ s))))))
· · ·
end.
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To compare with the abstract syntax explained in Fig. 1, the transformation of bbs_asm into concrete syntax leads to a
snippet of code that ends as follows:
...
L228: lw $t8, 0($t1)
L229: andi $t8, $t8, 1
L230: sllv $t8, $t8, $a1
L231: or $t9, $t9, $t8
L232: addiu $a1, $a1, 1
L233: b L5
L234: sw $t9, 0($v0)
L235: addiu $v0, $v0, 4
L236: addiu $at, $at, 1
L237: b L2
To run the above concrete syntaxwe append automatically constant initialization and loading instructions using a custom
script.
The resulting assembly program is run thanks to a cross-compilation environment built out of GNU tools. Binaries can
be executed in the GDB debugger that provides simulation for SmartMIPS. For illustration, let us run the resulting assembly
programwith input seed 31558851269462817406 and modulus 76318188169561490797 (= 8736028127× 8736028211)
(to be stored in 4-words multi-precision integers), and ask for pseudorandom 5 × 32 bits. Using appropriate printf
statements, the final state of execution in GBD is rendered as follows:
X: 51494fd9 2550c923 00000000 00000000 00000000
M: 0421c56d 2320abca 00000004 00000000 00000000
L: bc84f41a eaa29f7a 632d1e04 38e58a1f 9eb00e50
Y: 8bc820b0 c8f2492f 00000003 00000000 00000000
B: c89a91c3 661fa03e 00000003 00000000
One can confirm that the memory area L displays the right result.
An interesting thing happened during this validating experiment that should be put to the credit of formal verification.
In fact, the version of GDB (7.0.1) we used did not behave at first as expected, returning obviously a non-random output.
After investigation, it turned out that the support for SmartMIPS simulation was not properly implemented. Thanks to the
experience of having formalized the semantics of SmartMIPS in Coq, it took us little time to figure out the relevant bugs and
provide an appropriate patch [26].
7. Technical aspects of the Coq formalization
The formalization of assembly programs, operational semantics, separation logic, as well as all supporting lemmas is the
result of an extension and revision of previous work [2]. The revision was made necessary to address scalability issues. We
do not comment extensively about it except to say that we used SSReflect [12], a recently publicized Coq extension, that
favors a proof style that naturally led to shorter proof scripts (roughly, proof scripts of experiments in [2] shrank by 70% in
terms of lines of codes).
The new aspect of our framework is the generic formalization of the proof-carrying code framework of [23], with its
extension to support multiple instructions and error states, and its instantiation to SmartMIPS and separation logic. Table 1
makes it clear what is formalized2 w.r.t. [23]; the size of proof scripts is given in terms of lines of codes, after removing
blanks and comments.
The formal proof of the separation logic triple of Section 5.1 is the most demanding part of the proof effort. Our assembly
program of BBS is large (at least by the current standards of proof assistant based verification [2,18]): 237 instructions (after
inlining of all functions) that spread over several snippets of code. Table 2 gives the list of used snippets and their size.
Table 3 summarizes the size of proof scripts used in the proof of the separation logic triple of BBS. The Montgomery
square is a variant of the Montgomery multiplication, so that proof scripts are similar in contents. The multi-precision
subtraction works ‘‘in-place’’, i.e. it overrides the minuend with the difference. It is always difficult to comment about the
size of proof scripts because we are lacking good metrics for comparison. Yet, looking at related work, it is fair to claim that
our framework for formal proof of assembly programs allows for short proof scripts: this can be appreciated by looking at
several similar experiments in common among the work in this article and [2,18] (verification of multi-precision arithmetic
and Montgomery multiplication—also Montgomery exponentiation, not used in this article but available online [3]):
Finally, Table 4 summarizes the size of proof scripts used to extract the semantics of BBS in assembly and to perform the
implementation step as explained in Section 5.
2 In brief, what we do not do: we do not formalize Section 5 of [23] andwe formalize only the so-called ‘‘non-constructive proofs’’ of Theorems 17 and 18
(indeed, for these two theorems, the proofs come in two flavors).
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Table 1
Formalization of [23].
Reference in [23] Reference in [3] and status Size
Section 2 file goto.v 354 lines
Figure 1, Lemma 1, 3 Done
Lemma 2 Particular cases only
Section 3 file sgoto.v 579 lines
Section 3.1: Figure 2, Lemmas 4–5, DoneTheorems 6–8, Corollary 9
Section 3.2: Figure 3, Theorem 10, DoneLemma 11, Theorem 12
Section 4 file compile.v 963 lines
Section 4.1: Figure 5, DoneLemmas 13–14, Theorems 15–16
Section 4.2: Theorems 17–18 Done
Section 4.3 Done, file sgoto_hoare.v 293 lines
Section 5 Not done
Appendix A Done
file while.v 754 lines
Appendix B
Theorems 6–7, 15–18 Done (spread over above files)
Table 2
The assembly code of BBS in Coq.
Function Reference in [3] Program size
BBS (Fig. 1) bbs_prg.v 14 commands
Montgomery strict (Fig. 2) mont_mul_strict_prg.v 9 commands
Montgomery raw [2] mont_mul_prg.v 36 commands
Multi-precision subtraction [3] multi_sub_prg.v 18 commands
Multi-precision comparison [3] multi_lt_prg.v 13 commands
Array initialization [3] multi_zero_prg.v 6 commands
Table 3
Formal proof of the separation logic triple of BBS.
Function Reference in [3] Size
BBS bbs_triple.v 647 lines
Montgomery strict mont_mul_strict_init_triple.v 502 lines
mont_square_strict_init_triple.v 476 lines
Montgomery raw mont_mul_triple.v 1025 lines
mont_square_triple.v 997 lines
Multi-precision subtraction multi_sub_inplace_left_triple.v 355 lines
Multi-precision comparison multi_lt_triple.v 370 lines
Array initialization multi_zero_triple.v 111 lines
Total 4483 lines
8. Related work
Our work combines a framework for the formal verification of cryptographic assembly code [2] with a framework for the
formal verification of security proofs [20].
For the formal verification of assembly code, one may think of alternative approaches, that may potentially alleviate
the burden of interactive proof in Hoare logic. Proof-producing compilation (from a high-level language suitable for
specification, down to assembly code) is such an approach. However, it is not clear that a proof-producing compiler (such as
the one of [19]) can be instrumented so as to yield code that is as efficient as hand-written assembly code (as typically found
in cryptographic software), especially when the latter can take advantage of instructions tailored to the implementation
of cryptography. Formal verification by refinement from a functional specification is sometimes considered as an approach
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Table 4
Security proof for BBS in assembly.
Files contents Reference in [3] Size
Termination proofs bbs_termination.v 177 lines
mont_mul_strict_termination.v 91 lines
mont_square_strict_termination.v 92 lines
mont_mul_termination.v 229 lines
mont_square_termination.v 138 lines
multi_sub_termination.v 123 lines
multi_lt_termination.v 224 lines
multi_zero_termination.v 71 lines
Semantics extraction (Section 5.2) bbs_encode_decode.v 959 lines
Implementation step (Section 5.3) BBS_Asm_CryptoProof.v 270 lines
Total 2374 lines
that potentially leads to shorter proof scripts. However, application of this approach to cryptographic assembly code in [18]
does not seem to reconcile short proof scripts with compact assembly code.
We think that our work shows that interactive proof in Hoare logic can be a viable approach when the framework for
program verification is adequately instrumented. For example, the proof-carrying code framework of [23] turns out to be
instrumental in dealingwith assemblywith jumps. Also,we find separation logic [22] convenient and expressive towrite and
prove triples involving pointers; nevertheless, it should be noted that there exist alternative ways to conveniently express
separation properties (e.g., directly in higher order logic [14]). Our approach is based on a faithful model of assembly code
with a compilation function that does not perform complex transformations; alternatively, one may want to experiment
formal verification with a more abstract model by deferring burden on a more involved compilation function: such an
approach may bring more automation (à la [11]) to formal verification.
As for the formal verification of security proofs, there exist several frameworks based on proof assistants [5,6,20]. They
all rely on games [24] but differ on how they implement them. More precisely, games are shallow embedded in [20] (they
are modeled as Coq functions) and deep embedded in [5,6] (their syntax and semantics are encoded by inductive types). It
turns out that the two frameworks ([2] and [20]) that we integrate here are a good fit for they are both based on shallow
embeddings: on the one hand, shallow encoding is used in [2] to encode Hoare logic assertions, and on the other hand, it is
used in [20] to represent games. Therefore, algorithms written as Coq functions can simply appear in Hoare logic assertions,
making for an easy integration. In addition, our use-case directly relies on properties of arithmetic (including an encoding
of the quadratic residuosity problem) an originality of [21].
9. Conclusion
We addressed the problem of formal verification of assembly code with security proofs. We proposed an approach
that extends game-playing to integrate formal proofs of functional correctness with formal security proofs in a clear way,
understandable by both cryptographers and implementers. Our proposal is supported by a concrete framework developed
in the Coq proof assistant. As an illustration, we provided the first assembly program for a pseudorandom number generator
that is certified with a security proof.
Future work. The security proof of BBS on which we rely is asymptotic: the probability that an attacker predicts the next bit
can be made arbitrarily small, but it does not give any concrete value for the security parameter. A possible extension of our
approach would be to link our assembly implementation of BBS to a security proof of the concrete security of BBS.
Our certified implementation of BBS can be used as the source of pseudorandomness in the implementation of further
cryptographic primitives: one can extract their semantics as a mathematical function and inject it into the appropriate
standard definition of security (such as semantic security in the case of ElGamal). Our approach could also be extended
to deal with nondeterminism and thus certify cryptographic primitives relying on sources of truly random bits. Another
extension worth investigation is the support for probabilistic termination that one can find, e.g., in probabilistic decryption.
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